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The human cognitive system is equipped with various processes for dealing with everyday
challenges. One of such processes is the inhibition of currently irrelevant goals or mental
task-sets, which can be seen as a response to the critical event of information overﬂow in
the cognitive system and challenging the cognitive system’s ability to keep track of ongo-
ing demands. In two experiments, we investigate the ﬂexibility of the inhibitory process
by inserting rare non-critical events (25% of all trials), operationalized as univalent stimuli
(i.e., unambiguous stimuli that call for only one speciﬁc task in a multitasking context),
and by introducing the possibility to prepare for an upcoming task (Experiment 2). We
found that the inhibitory process is not inﬂuenced by a cue informing subjects about the
upcoming occurrence of a univalent stimulus. However, the introduction of univalent stim-
uli allowed preparatory processes tomodify the impact of the inhibitory process.Therefore,
our results suggest that inhibitory processes are engaged in a rather global manner, not
taking into account variations in stimulus valence, which we took as operationalization of
critical, conﬂict-inducing events in the ongoing stream of information processing. However,
rare uncritical events, such as univalent stimuli that do not cause conﬂict and interference
in the processing stream, appear to alter the way the cognitive system can take advantage
of preparatory processes.
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INTRODUCTION
Researchers in cognitive psychology usually refer to task activation
and task inhibitionprocesseswhen trying to explainhumanbehav-
ior in everyday life. Cognitive representations of tasks (i.e., task-
sets; e.g., Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Monsell, 1996) are thought
to comprise all elements of a task, such as the to be encountered
stimuli, the required responses, and the cues used to indicatewhich
task is the relevant one in the current trial. When investigating the
application of these task-sets, cognitive psychologists assume that
task-sets are activated and implemented in the cognitive system
to guarantee the successful achievement of goals, such as writing
an article or phoning a friend (see, e.g., Miller and Cohen, 2001).
However, even though goal-directed behavior is successful inmany
situations, people also encounter situations inwhich the successful
pursuit of the goal at hand becomes difﬁcult and they fail.
One classical, widely studied critical situation is multitasking,
where people are asked to switch rapidly from one task to another,
such as keeping an eye on the children in the living room while
preparing lunch for them. Furthermore, although activation of
currently relevant task-sets is a powerful mechanism, competition
among several activated task-sets causes interference and hampers
the successful implementation of the currently appropriate task-
set. This interference between task-sets has been suggested to be
causal for the observed performance costs when there is a switch
of task (i.e., a sequence like AB, where A and B denote to different
tasks) compared to a task repetition (i.e., AA). These switch costs
have been observed numerous times in task switching studies (see,
e.g., Kiesel et al., 2010, for a review).
In task switching, interference among task-sets is thought to
arise because of shared stimuli and responses which activate asso-
ciated task-sets in a bottom-up manner, for instance when subjects
are asked to judge a digit based on its magnitude (i.e., smaller vs.
larger than ﬁve) or parity (i.e., odd vs. even, see, e.g., Koch andAll-
port, 2006). The notion of competition and interference among
task-sets has fostered the proposal of inhibitory mechanisms that
reduce the activation of a competing task-set and therefore help
the selection of the now appropriate task-set and reduce inter-
ference (see, e.g., Monsell, 2003). The present study is aimed at
examining inhibitory processes in task switching.
An empirical marker of inhibitory processes in the selection
among various task-sets are the so-called n−2 task repetition costs
(Mayr and Keele, 2000; see Koch et al., 2010, for a review). These
costs are calculated as the performance difference between n−2
task switches (i.e., sequences such as CBA) and n−2 repetitions
(sequences such as ABA). An account that assumes activation only
would predict that switching back to a task that was recently (i.e.,
two trials earlier) performed would facilitate performance due
to repetition priming (i.e., residual activation) and thus decrease
reaction time (RTs). In contrast, an inhibition account predicts
exactly the opposite, namely that after having performed task A,
subjects have to inhibit the task to successfully switch to task B.
When encountering task A again, its activation is still reduced
below baseline, so that activating task A again (and thereby over-
coming residual inhibition) takes longer and increases RTs relative
to the n−2 non-repetition control condition (e.g.,Mayr andKeele,
2000;Gade andKoch, 2007). This is exactly what has been found in
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many studies (see Koch et al., 2010, for a review), establishing n−2
task repetition costs as a valid marker for inhibitory mechanisms
in the performance of task sequences.
One question that has arisen shortly after the discovery of
n−2 repetition costs was related to the conditions that trigger
inhibitory mechanisms in multitasking. Studies aiming at the
identiﬁcation of the triggering conditions of n−2 repetition costs
investigated response-related factors such as response selection
or execution (for example Schuch and Koch, 2003; Gade and
Koch, 2007; Philipp et al., 2007a; Schneider andVerbruggen, 2008),
while other studies identiﬁed cue-related factors (Houghton et al.,
2009; Grange and Houghton, 2011) or stimulus-related factors
(Arbuthnott, 2008; Sdoia and Ferlazzo, 2008) that gave rise to n−2
repetition costs. Furthermore, n−2 repetition costs were found to
be largely insensitive to variations in preparation time (Mayr and
Keele, 2000; Schuch and Koch, 2003; Gade and Koch, 2008), sug-
gesting that engaging in active cognitive preparation of a task-set
does not usually help to overcome the residual inhibition (but see
Grange and Houghton, 2011). Moreover,n−2 task repetition costs
were found even though subjects knew that they will have to per-
form the just inhibited task again (Mayr and Keele, 2000; Koch
et al., 2006). To conclude, inhibition of competing tasks, which
can be measured as n−2 task repetition costs, is a powerful means
of the cognitive system to deal with critical situations of task con-
ﬂict, that is, situations involving several active task-sets and the
need to select one of them to successfully to meet the situational
requirements. However, the triggering conditions are not yet fully
understood.
In fact, although being reliably obtained, the size of n−2 task
repetition costs varied widely across studies. This may suggest that
the amount of inhibition (as reﬂected in the size of n−2 repetition
costs) is tied to the amount of conﬂict experienced in the trial
before the current trial (i.e., trial n−1). In line with this sugges-
tion, Gade and Koch (2005) found that the size of n−2 repetition
costs was linked to the time elapsed between the response in the
preceding trial and the next cue (the response-cue interval). They
observed a decrease in n−2 repetition costs with increasing RCI
and attributed it to decay of residual task activation, which then
produces less competing activation of the recently abandoned task
(Gade and Koch, 2005; see Horoufchin et al., 2011, for a discussion
of the issue of RCI effects in task switching). Next to decreased task
activation,also thedominanceof a taskhas been found to inﬂuence
the size of n−2 repetition costs. Using a speech production par-
adigm requiring the naming of visually presented digits, Philipp
et al. (2007b) asked their subjects to switch among three languages
and found signiﬁcantly larger n−2 repetition costs for the more
dominant language (L1; i.e., German, for German subjects) com-
pared to the other languages assessed in the experiment (see also
Arbuthnott, 2008, for a related ﬁnding). Furthermore, Grange and
Houghton (2010) could show that an increase in intertrial-conﬂict
by the change in cue-task mapping increased n−2 repetition costs.
Finally, Philipp and Koch (2006) observed that the introduction
of immediate (i.e., n−1) task repetitions lead to reduced n−2
repetition costs. They interpreted their ﬁnding according to a
balance between activation and inhibition processes ensuring the
optimal equilibrium of activation and inhibition in the cognitive
system (Philipp and Koch, 2006).
To summarize this brief review, there is evidence that the size of
n−2 repetition costs is related to the amount of processing conﬂict
among tasks. For this article, which is about the notion of critical-
ity in living systems, we take the concept of conﬂict as equivalent
to the idea of a critical event, and cognitive conﬂicts can be suit-
ably explored in multitasking situations, such as in task switching.
Therefore, we take changes in processing demands that reduce
conﬂict among tasks (and consequently the size of n−2 repetition
costs) as those variables that reduce criticality of the ongoing pro-
cessing demands. Thus,we use an operational deﬁnition of critical
events by means of conﬂict among tasks.
In the present study,we set out to investigatewhether inhibitory
mechanisms leading to n−2 repetition costs are inﬂuenced by
stimulus valence. Previous task switching research has shown that
stimulus valence is a powerful trigger of conﬂict among tasks (see
Kiesel et al., 2010). We were speciﬁcally interested in whether a
univalent stimulus modulates the size of n−2 repetition cost. Uni-
valent stimuli are stimuli that call only for one task and thus do
not afford task conﬂict. Stimulus valence (i.e., multivalent vs. uni-
valent) has been rarely assessed when investigating the triggering
conditions of task inhibition.
In one of the rare studies, Sdoia and Ferlazzo (2008) had sub-
jects perform three tasks (two numerical judgment tasks and one
perceptual colormatching short-termmemory task) on either uni-
valent or trivalent stimuli (i.e., colored digits, the stimulusmaterial
for the numerical judgment tasks). Sdoia and Ferlazzo (2008)
found n−2 repetition costs only for trivalent stimuli, while there
were no n−2 repetition costs for univalent stimuli (i.e., colored
patches). They concluded that overlap on the level of the stimuli
could also give rise to n−2 repetition costs. However, please note
that in this study, the color matching task (i.e., same or differ-
ent) was a purely perceptual task and therefore differed from the
two numerical judgment tasks in terms of difﬁculty and memory
engagement. This difference in tasks might account for the failure
of ﬁnding n−2 repetition costs with univalent stimuli in the ﬁrst
place. In a different study, Gade and Koch (2007) were primarily
interested in investigating the role of response set overlap (i.e.,
response valence), but they also used univalent stimuli in 25% of
trials. However, like in Sdoia and Ferlazzo’s (2008) study, univa-
lent stimuli where confounded with task identity and this speciﬁc
task also had a different response set. That is, in both Sdoia and
Ferlazzo’s (2008) study and Gade and Koch’s (2007) study, the data
on the role of stimulus valence and its relation to n−2 task repe-
tition costs were associated with a confound of task identity with
stimulus valence, rendering clear conclusions difﬁcult.
The present study was aimed to systematically examine the role
of stimulus valence in task inhibition deconfounded with task
identity or response set differences. In Experiment 1, we intro-
duced 25% univalent trials, independent of task identity. That is,
any of the three tasks was either performed on a trivalent stim-
ulus (i.e., a stimulus consisting of members of all three stimulus
sets, see Figure 1) or on a univalent stimulus that afforded only
one task. If stimulus valence leads to less conﬂict among tasks,
then we should see reduced n−2 repetition costs after a univalent
stimulus in trial n−1 because univalent stimuli should not call for
inhibitory processes to reduce task-set conﬂict. This assumption is
based on the ﬁnding that univalent stimuli in two-tasks paradigms
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FIGURE 1 | Stimulus display with trivalent stimuli (left) and univalent
stimuli (right) in Experiment 1 and 2. Colored frames served as cues. In
Experiment 2, the diamonds were replaced by straight lines.
lead to less switch costs and shorter RTs, indicating facilitated pro-
cessing (e.g.,Meiran, 2008; Braverman and Meiran, 2010) and that
bivalency of stimuli incurs a cost (Woodward et al., 2003).
However, to make sure that subjects knew in advance about
the less critical, less conﬂict-inducing events, and thus to further
reduce the potential task conﬂict, each univalent stimulus was
indicated by a task-unspeciﬁc cue, informing the subject that the
next stimulus would be univalent, but not announcing the iden-
tity of the upcoming task (which had to be inferred from the
univalent stimulus). In all other trials, tasks were indicated by a
task-speciﬁc cue.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHOD
Subjects
Thirty-two subjects (18 women,mean age 23.8 years) participated
in the experiment and were paid 8 Euro.
Stimuli and tasks
Subjects performed a letter judgment (consonant vs. vowel), a digit
judgment (odd vs. even), or a symbol judgment (text symbols vs.
math symbols), as indicated by a cue. The stimuli were presented
in the center of a 15′′ color monitor connected to an IBM compat-
ible PC. The stimulus display consisted of all three kinds of stimuli
that were arranged in a column, so that subjects had to use the cue
to decide which task to perform. The stimulus set for the letter task
was (A,E,U,D,P,W). Stimuli for the digit task were (2, 4, 6, 3, 5, 7).
For the symbol task, stimuli consisted of a set of symbols (!, ’, ., +,
=,<). Stimulus position varied randomly from trial to trial. Cues
were colored rectangles surrounding the stimulus display. A blue
rectangle indicated the letter task, a green rectangle the digit task,
and a yellow one the symbol task. These cues are further referred to
as task-speciﬁc cues. However, in one fourth of the trials, subjects
were presentedwith a red rectangle,merely indicating a task switch
without informing about the task identity in the next trial. This cue
is referred to as task-unspeciﬁc cue, and the subsequent stimulus
display consisted of two diamonds and one stimulus being associ-
ated with one of the three tasks (see Figure 1). Because of practical
reasons, one half of the subjects used the ALT and ALT GR keys
of a German computer keyboard for responding, and the other
half of subjects responded on an external keyboard by pressing
one of the two horizontally aligned keys with the index ﬁnger of
the right and left hand. External response keys measured approxi-
mately 1.7 cm and were spatially separated by 3.2 cm. Testing took
place in a dimly lit room. Viewing distance was about 50 cm.
Procedure
The experiment was run in a single session with one subject at
a time and took about 60min. Written instructions appeared on
the screen, and the experiment was also explained orally. Subjects
were informed that they were required to perform three differ-
ent tasks, depending on the cue surrounding the stimulus display.
Subjects were instructed to make use of the cue because most
stimulus displays would contain all three kinds of stimuli, requir-
ing the information conveyed by the cue. The S-R mappings were
explained for all tasks (with the mappings being counterbalanced
across subjects) and a card containing these mappings was placed
below the monitor. Subjects performed two practice blocks of 10
and 15 trials to get familiar with the cues and the tasks. In a third
practice block, consisting of 25 trials, the task-unspeciﬁc cues were
introduced. Task-unspeciﬁc cues were always followed by univa-
lent stimuli. All three tasks occurred equally often within a block,
and sodid all possible task triplets. Immediate task repetitionswere
excluded. The task sequence was pseudo-random due to the con-
straints described above. The stimulus and response sequence was
random with the constraint that each stimulus appeared equally
often within one block. Direct stimulus repetition did not occur.
The instruction emphasized both speed and accuracy. Subjects
received feedback when they committed an error.
A trial started with a blank screen for 500ms. Then the cue
appeared, followed by the stimulus display after 500ms. Stimuli
and cue remained on the screen until the response was given. An
experimental block of trials consisted of 75 trials. After each block,
subjects received feedback about their mean RT and were invited
to take a small break before starting with the next block. Alto-
gether, subjects performed nine experimental blocks followed by
a post-experimental interview.
Design
To assess whether our manipulation of stimulus valence had the
expected impact we compared performance in trial n for univalent
and trivalent stimuli. Please note that according to the retroactive
nature of task inhibition (Koch et al., 2010), our main analysis
focuses on stimulus valence in trial n−1 and task sequence, lead-
ing to the two independent variables task sequence (n−2 repetition
vs. n−2 switch) and stimulus valence in trial n−1 (univalent vs.
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trivalent). To accomplish this analysis, we constructed the triplets
relevant for data analysis in such a way that both the task in trial
n−2 and the task in trial n were performed on trivalent stimuli,
whereas univalent stimuli were only allowed to occur in trial n−1.
In each block, univalent stimuli, indicated by a task-unspeciﬁc cue,
were randomly interspersed in one-fourth of the trials. Immediate
repetition of trials with univalent stimuli was possible, but these
trials were excluded from analysis. The dependent variables were
RT and error rate.
RESULTS
Only correct trials that were preceded by at least two correct trials
were included in the data analysis. We standardized RTs for each
subject separately and regarded RTs larger than z = 3 as outliers
(1.6% of otherwise correct trials). The data from one subject were
excluded because of an error rate over 15%; however, the over-
all data pattern did not change when including these data in the
analysis.
Tomake sure that ourmanipulation of stimulus valence had the
expected effect,we examined the effect of stimulus valence (univa-
lent vs. trivalent) in trial n using a paired t -test. Subjects performed
127ms faster on univalent stimuli compared to trivalent stimuli
[1581ms vs. 1709ms, t (30)= 5.0, p< 0.05], indicating that our
manipulation of stimulus valence was successful. The mean error
rate for subjects was 1.5% for univalent trials, whereas it was 4.9%
for trivalent trials [t (30)= 10.64, p< 0.05], further corroborating
the idea that univalent stimuli induced less processing conﬂict in
the current trial. Based on this empirically established effect of
stimulus valence, we now turn to the analysis of the inﬂuence of
stimulus valence as a triggering condition for task inhibition; that
is, we examine performance as a function of stimulus valence in
the preceding trial (trial n−1) to see whether it affects the degree
of inhibition that we can measure (as an after-effect) as n−2 task
repetition costs. RT and percentage error as a function of stimulus
valence in trial n−1 and task sequence is shown in Table 1.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) on RT using stimulus valence
in trial n−1 (trivalent vs. univalent) and task sequence (n−2 rep-
etition vs. n−2 switch) as independent variables revealed a main
effect of stimulus valence in trial n−1, F(1, 30)= 40.62, p< 0.05,
pη2 = 0.58. RT was higher after a trial with a univalent stimu-
lus than after a trial with a trivalent stimulus (1906 vs. 1839ms),
Table 1 | RT (SD) and PE (SD) in Experiment 1 for trivalent stimuli in
trial n as a function of task sequence (n−2 repetition vs. n−2 switch)
and stimulus valence in trial n−1 (trivalent vs. univalent).
Stimulus valence in trial n−1
Trivalent Univalent
RT PE RT PE
n−2 Repetition 1744 (237) 6.7 (3.3) 1906 (321) 4.8 (4.1)
n−2 Switch 1699 (229) 4.9 (3.4) 1839 (202) 5.3 (4.5)
Difference 45 1.8 67 −0.5
RT, reaction time, PE, percentage error, SD, standard deviation.
which is probably due to the change from the univalent stimulus
display back to the multivalent display (see also Gade and Koch,
2007). Importantly, we also obtained a signiﬁcant main effect of
task sequence, F(1, 30)= 12.97, p< 0.05, pη2 = 0.30, indicating
overall n−2 task repetition costs of 56ms. However, contrary to
the expectation based on the idea that univalent stimuli do not
call for inhibitory processes to resolve task-set conﬂict (or do so
much less), these n−2 task repetition costs were not at all larger
after a trivalent stimuli than after a univalent stimulus but even
numerically smaller (45 vs. 67ms), but this difference was clearly
non-signiﬁcant (F < 1).
Theoverall error ratewas 6.1%(seeTable 1). Therewasnomain
effect of stimulus valence in trial n−1 or of task sequence (both
Fs< 1.8, both ps> 0.20, pη2< 0.1). Also the interaction effect was
non-signiﬁcant, F(1, 30)= 3.7, p> 0.06, pη2 = 0.11, even though
there was in fact a numerical trend toward larger n−2 repeti-
tion costs after trivalent stimuli than after univalent stimuli. Note,
however, that the absolute number of errors after the univalent
stimulus was very small (as was the number of errors for univa-
lent trials in general because these trials were infrequent relative
to those trials following a trivalent cue, so that these error data are
more variable, rendering the interpretation of error rates in this
condition rather inconclusive.
DISCUSSION
In Experiment 1,we foundn−2 repetition costs both for trials after
a univalent stimulus and trials after a trivalent stimulus. These
costs did not differ as a function of stimulus valence, although our
manipulation showed reduced RT and error rates for univalent
stimuli in the current trial, so that we have empirical evidence for
the clear effect of our experimental variation of stimulus valence.
However, one way to account for this lack of an effect of stim-
ulus valence in the preceding trial might be that subjects have
adopted a strategy to inhibit the just performed task when the
task-unspeciﬁc cue came up. Therefore it is difﬁcult to isolate the
effect of stimulus valence from cue type (speciﬁc vs. unspeciﬁc).
Experiment 2 allowed us to examine more directly the inﬂuence
of stimulus valence by disentangling the variation of stimulus
valence from the additional introduction of an attention-grabbing
task-unspeciﬁc cue as used in Experiment 1.
In Experiment 2, we used task-speciﬁc cues only and still intro-
duced 25% univalent stimuli randomly in the task sequence. In
addition, to assess the degree to which subjects used the task-
speciﬁc cues,we varied the cue-target interval (CTI). Previous task
switching studies have demonstrated that both RT level generally
and switch costs particularly are decreased with a long CTI, sug-
gesting a process of active task preparation (see Kiesel et al., 2010,
for a review). Hence, in Experiment 2 we could establish empir-
ically whether subjects actively process the cue prior to stimulus
onset.
EXPERIMENT 2
METHOD
Subjects
Twenty-four new subjects participated either for course credit or
the payment of 15 CHF. Subjects had a mean age of 23.7 years and
21 of them were female.
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Stimuli, tasks, and procedure
Stimuli, tasks, andprocedurewere the same as in Experiment 1,but
we omitted the task-unspeciﬁc cues. Moreover, to make sure that
subjects used the task-speciﬁc cues we introduced a CTI manipu-
lation. Subjects performed blocks with long (i.e., 900ms) CTI and
blocks with short (i.e., 100ms) CTI in alternating order. CTI order
was counterbalanced across subjects. The ﬁrst block was regarded
as practice and was not further analyzed. Subjects performed 12
blocks of 75 trials followed by a post-experimental interview. As in
Experiment 1, 25% of trials were performed on univalent stimuli.
Design
The independent within-subjects variables were stimulus valence
in trial n−1 (trivalent vs. univalent), CTI (100 vs. 900ms), and
task sequence (n−2 repetition vs. n−2 switch). The dependent
variables were RT and error rate.
RESULTS
Only correct trials that were preceded by at least two correct trials
were included in the data analysis. We standardized RTs for each
subject separately and regarded RTs larger than z = 3 as outliers
(1.6% of otherwise correct trials). RT and percentage error as a
function of stimulus in trial n−1, CTI, and task sequence is shown
in Table 2.
To establish that our manipulation of stimulus valence had
the intended effect of reducing task conﬂict, we analyzed perfor-
mance in trial n depending on stimulus valence. Subjects were
285ms faster when the current stimulus was univalent compared
to a trivalent stimulus [1082 vs. 1367ms, t (23)= 8.78, p< 0.05],
so again the introduction of univalent stimuli led to faster perfor-
mance. Accuracy was not affected by stimulus valence (0.6% for
both types of trials).
An ANOVA on RT using stimulus valence in trial n−1 (uni-
valent vs. trivalent), CTI (100 vs. 900ms), and task sequence
(n−2 repetition vs. n−2 switch) as within-subjects variables
revealed a main effect of task sequence, F(1, 23)= 10.66, p< 0.05,
pη2 = 0.31, indicating overall n−2 repetition costs of 64ms. Stim-
ulus valence in trial n−1 lead to a main effect [F(1, 23)= 12.45,
pη2 = 35.1], indicating that subjects were, like in Experiment 1,
slower after a univalent stimulus in trial n−1 (1337 vs. 1413ms,
for trivalent and univalent stimuli in trial n−1, respectively). CTI
also yielded a main effect, F(1, 23)= 304.30, p< 0.05, pη2 = 0.93,
suggesting that subjects engaged in preparation for the upcoming
task although this might turn out to be a trial with a univalent
stimulus, in which case cue processing is not required because the
stimulus affords only one task. Importantly, like in Experiment
1, the interaction of stimulus valence and task sequence was not
signiﬁcant (F < 1). n−2 Repetition costs were 50ms after triva-
lent stimuli in trial n−1 [t (23)= 3.9, p< 0.05] and 83ms after
univalent stimuli in trial n−1 [t (23)= 3.9, p< 0.05]. Interest-
ingly, the interaction of task sequence and CTI was signiﬁcant,
F(1, 23)= 7.19, p< 0.05, pη2 = 0.24, indicating a reduction of
n−2 repetition cost with long CTI (104 vs. 24ms, for short vs.
long CTI, respectively). The residual n−2 task repetition costs
of 24ms were no longer signiﬁcant [t (23)= 0.90, p> 0.30]. This
preparatory reduction of the inhibition effect occurred regard-
less of stimulus valence, that is, neither the three-way interac-
tion nor any other interaction was signiﬁcant (all Fs< 1, see
Figure 2).
The overall error rate was 3.6% (see Table 2). Only stimu-
lus valence in trial n−1 yielded a signiﬁcant main effect [F(1,
23)= 12.96, p< 0.05, pη2 = 0.36], indicating more errors after a
trivalent stimulus (4%) than after a univalent stimulus (2.7%).
(Note that this effect indicates a speed-accuracy tradeoff because
RTs were actually signiﬁcantly shorter after a trivalent stimulus
than after a univalent stimulus.) No other signiﬁcant results were
obtained (all ps> 0.15).
DISCUSSION
In Experiment 2, we used only task-speciﬁc cues. Our manipu-
lation of stimulus valence showed the intended effect in trial n,
so that performance was faster with univalent stimuli, suggest-
ing reduced task conﬂict (see Braverman and Meiran, 2010, for
related results). Importantly, we found n−2 task repetition costs
regardless of stimulus valence in the preceding trial (i.e., n−1);
again, like in Experiment 1 these were descriptively even some-
what larger after a univalent stimulus. The results of Experiment
2 thus closely replicate those of Experiment 1, suggesting that
Table 2 | RT (SD) and PE (SD) in Experiment 2 for trivalent stimuli in trial n as a function of task sequence (n−2 repetition vs. n−2 switch),
stimulus valence in trial n−1 (trivalent vs. univalent), and cue-target interval (short vs. long).
CTI
Stimulus valence in trial n−1
Short Long
Trivalent Univalent Trivalent Univalent
RT PE RT PE RT PE RT PE
n−2 Repetition 1559 (272) 4.0 (2.9) 1639 (378) 3.2 (2.5) 1169 (274) 4.0 (4.9) 1260 (395) 3.0 (2.3)
n−2 Switch 1466 (290) 3.9 (3.7) 1525 (363) 2.8 (3.3) 1154 (317) 3.9 (2.8) 1228 (317) 1.5 (2.0)
Difference 93 0.1 114 0.4 15 0.1 32 1.5
RT, reaction time, PE, percentage error, SD, standard deviation.
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FIGURE 2 | n−2 Repetition cost as a function of stimulus valence in
trial n−1 and CTI for Experiment 2. Error bars denote 95% within-subject
conﬁdence intervals.
the ﬁnding of similar task inhibition effects after univalent and
trivalent stimuli in Experiment 1 was not due to some strategic
adaptation based on the task-unspeciﬁc warning cues.
Note that the substantial effect of the CTI suggests that subjects
actively prepared theupcoming task basedon the cues regardless of
the fact that the stimulus could have been univalent. However, we
also found that prolonged preparation time reduced the n−2 task
repetition costs, rendering these costs non-signiﬁcant with long
CTI. The issue of why the introduction of univalent stimuli appar-
ently favored an inﬂuence of cue-based preparation on n−2 task
repetition costs is discussed in the Section “General Discussion.”
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study was aimed to examine the degree of processing
conﬂict as a triggering condition for task inhibition inmultitasking
situations requiring rapid task switching. To this end, we exam-
ined the inﬂuence of stimulus valence in the preceding trial on
the occurrence of n−2 task repetition costs in two experiments.
In Experiment 1, we could show that presenting a task-unspeciﬁc
warning cue followed by a univalent stimulus in trial n−1 did
not abolish n−2 repetition costs measured in trial n. In Experi-
ment 2,we examined the impact of univalent stimuli more directly
and could rule out that the task-unspeciﬁc warning cue, used in
Experiment 1, gave rise to the pattern of comparable n−2 repeti-
tion costs regardless of stimulus valence in the preceding trial. To
summarize our results, the random insertion of 25% of univalent
stimuli did not abolish n−2 repetition costs, neither when they
occurred with a warning cue nor when they occurred completely
unpredictably.
The experimental variation of stimulus valence was based on
the notion that task conﬂict should be small when being faced
with univalent stimuli, because such stimuli afford only one
task (Woodward et al., 2003). Empirically we could establish this
expected effect of stimulus valence. Hence, if the level of conﬂict
in the current trial determines the strength of inhibition of the
most competing task (which is usually the immediately preceding,
just performed task) that we can measure as n−2 repetition costs,
then we should have observed reduced n−2 repetition costs after
univalent stimuli as did Sdoia and Ferlazzo (2008). However, this
was clearly not the case in two experiments. Both experiments had
reasonable statistical power, but the data trend actually at least
numerically even opposed our prediction in both experiments.
Please note that our study differed from the study of Sdoia and
Ferlazzo (2008) and the work of Gade and Koch (2007) in that
we did not assign a speciﬁc task to univalent stimuli or a speciﬁc,
different response set, which might provide alternative explana-
tions for the ﬁnding obtained by Sdoia and Ferlazzo (2008). In
another way, the data therefore support the conclusion drawn by
Gade and Koch (2007) in their third experiment, namely critical
and a triggering condition for task inhibition is indeed the overlap
in response set.
This ﬁnding suggests that task inhibition is a powerful means
of the cognitive system to deal with critical events, such as con-
ﬂict among, but it seems to be a very inﬂexible mechanism that
does not respond to the level of conﬂict induced by the stimu-
lus. Hence, even though we could demonstrate empirically that
univalent stimuli lead to less task conﬂict, it appears that the task
conﬂict that still remains based on overlap of the response sets
across tasks (Gade and Koch, 2007) is sufﬁcient to trigger the n−2
task repetition costs in full size, unmodulated by the variation of
stimulus valence.
However, univalent stimuli, although not directly inﬂuencing
the size of n−2 repetition costs, might none the less have altered
performance of the ongoing task sequence by indirect means
(for instance by a change in task-set shielding; Dreisbach and
Wenke, 2011). We found increased RTs after a univalent trial in
both experiments, which suggests that the exposition to a univa-
lent stimulus interrupted the routines subjects had developed for
solving the task requirements (see Lien et al., 2006, for a related
ﬁnding in a two-task paradigm). Therefore, although on its own
univalent trials might be experienced as easier than multivalent
trials, the data suggest that variations in stimulus valence appar-
ently lead to changes in the way people process the encountered
tasks.
Adaptation to current processing demands is widely docu-
mented in the task switching literature, for example by the impact
of stimulus congruency (that is whether or not the two dimen-
sions of a bivalent stimulus afford the same response or different
responses) on task switch costs (Goschke, 2000), or vice versa by
the inﬂuence of switching demands on congruency of otherwise
irrelevant stimulus features (Dreisbach and Wenke, 2011). In this
context, it is an important ﬁnding that in Experiment 2, we found
that prolonged preparation time decreased n−2 task repetition
costs, which seems to be an adaptive effect, too.
This preparatory reduction of n−2 task repetition costs is a
somewhat atypical ﬁnding, as the majority of previous studies
observed that long preparation time does not signiﬁcantly reduce
the size of n−2 repetition costs (e.g.,Mayr andKeele, 2000; Schuch
and Koch, 2003; Gade and Koch, 2008; see Grange and Houghton,
2011, for discussion). Yet, two other studies found a similar reduc-
tion of n−2 repetition costs with prolonged preparation time. In
one study,Philipp et al., 2007b,Experiment 2) assessedn−2 repeti-
tion costs when switching among languages, and in a second study
Koch et al. (2004) assessed n−2 repetition costs in switching of
response mode. It should be noted that these two studies, like the
present study, had experimental features that distinguished them
from the standard paradigm.
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That is, there was a clear dominance relationship among lan-
guages in the study by Philipp et al. (2007b), there were two
choice-response tasks but one simple-response task in the study
by Koch et al. (2004), and there were 25% univalent stimuli in the
present study. Please note that preparation time beneﬁts were not
solely observed for the altered tasks but were found to affect all
three tasks in our present study, as it was in the study of Koch et al.
(2004) and of Philipp et al. (2007b).
We think it is likely that the introduction of univalent tri-
als, which fostered adaptations such as a refocusing of attention
after a univalent trial (Meiran, 2008), might have also altered the
way prolonged preparation time inﬂuences the n−2 repetition
costs, by rendering variations in preparation time more salient.
While we assume that usually n−2 repetition costs are insensi-
tive to prolonged preparation time (Schuch and Koch, 2003, for a
more detailed argument), having to adapt to infrequent changes in
stimulus valence like in this study, or to different response effectors
(Koch et al., 2004), or to strong dominance hierarchies (Philipp
et al., 2007b) might encourage subjects to use prolonged prepa-
ration time more efﬁciently (Gade and Koch, 2008; see Grange
and Houghton, 2011, for a similar argument). Further research
will have to examine the underlying mechanism of this particular
preparatory phenomenon in more detail.
In sum, our data suggest the means, for example the inhibition
of the last performed task, by which the cognitive system deals
with critical events are used in a rather global fashion (i.e., for all
trials in a complete block or even experiment) and therefore are
inﬂexible to adapt to rare non-critical events.
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